Co-design by a firm and its suppliers has become a widely accepted means of developing new products, especially technologically-complex products. Much existing research emphasizes stable and trusting relationships as a "one-best way" for governing these co-design relations. This article questions this view. The article argues that co-design relations are likely to be diverse, unstable, and conflictual due to the inherent nature of the co-design activity. The inherent diversity of co-design relations is explained by the need to organize for distinct coordination needs. Three coordination processes, each directed toward a different coordination need, are derived from the study of a single aerospace co-design project.
Introduction
A great deal of research has been done on why companies should co-design new products with suppliers, especially for technologically complex products (see Takeishi, 2001 , for a review), and numerous researchers have emphasized to this end close, stable, and trusting relations between the firm and its suppliers (Helper, 1991; Nishiguchi, 1994; Dyer, 1996; Jones et al., 1997; Helper et al., 2000) .
However, despite the considerable literature on co-design, interaction processes between a firm and its suppliers have been rarely studied directly (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Takeishi 2001; Gerwin, 2004) . And the emphasis on close, trusting relations with long-standing suppliers implies a homogeneity and stability of relations, or at least a tendency towards these, but there is evidence that this view is not supported by practice. For instance, both Ahmadjian and Lincoln (2001) and Brusoni et al. (2001) indicate that outsourcing relations are stable only for limited periods of time. On the other hand, Herrigel (2004) and Whitford and Zeitlin (2004) both point to systemic barriers within firms to fully developing cooperative relations with suppliers.
to undermine the other two, and conflict resulting from these tensions tended to destabilize co-design relations. I conclude that diverse, unstable, and tense relations are systematically produced in co-designing with suppliers and that overall project performance depends, in particular, on how interactions between distinct coordination logics are managed.
The article proceeds as follows. The next section reviews what current literature has to say about coordination requirements for co-design. I then introduce my research setting and method, which is followed by a results section. After a discussion of my results, a final section concludes with a discussion of implications and future research.
Conceptual background
A great many of the products we use are composed of many distinct components: the typical passenger car contains more than 30,000 parts, the typical large jet aircraft has been described as 3 million parts flying in close formation (Sabbagh, 1995) . These parts will not haphazardly contribute to product performance but rather will do so as clusters that function as distinct technological subsystems. The engine in a car or the wing of an aircraft is each a distinct subsystem composed of many components, and each contributes to important product functions. How well each subsystem contributes to product functioning depends on how well its internal parts fit and work together, and how well the subsystem fits and works together with the other subsystems. The architecture of the product sets out all of these relations. The distinction between architecture and subsystem implies two distinct levels of technological knowledge for successful new-product development (NPD): architectural knowledge (knowledge of how to integrate functionalities and subsystems into a coherent product) and subsystem knowledge (knowledge of how to implement particular functionalities) (Henderson and Clark, 1990) .
Applying this architectural and subsystem knowledge to NPD requires decomposing the abstract NPD activity into tasks and coordinating between these tasks. Coordination maintains ongoing unity of effort between those working on interdependent tasks and aspects of the design by, for example, increasing the frequency of information exchange and shortening the time for iterations of design tasks or reducing their number (Clark and Fujimoto 1991; Smith and Eppinger 1997) . Concurrent engineering is the term used to describe the early and simultaneous involvement of different functions and design teams in a coordinated approach to NPD; it has become the paradigm for achieving coordination in NPD (Griffin 1997) .
The organization design for a technologically-complex NPD project will require more than a single cross-functional NPD team. Rather, it is likely to match a distinct team to each subsystem, or even sub-subsystem (Sabbagh, 1995) . Coordinating between these teams requires deliberately managing the exchange of information between them-there are too many teams, each with their own objectives, to be able to rely on informal team processes for coordination (Galbraith, 1994; Kazanjian et al., 2000; Terwiesch et al., 2002) . Coordination is further complicated by most aspects of a product's functionality (e.g., speed in a car or lift in an aircraft) being delivered by the intensive and interactive operation of two or more subsystems. Anticipating the subsystem interactions in order to properly configure them will require prolonged, iterative, and intensive communication between the teams designing each subsystem (Sabbagh 1995; Terwiesch et al., 2002) . These communication needs are exacerbated by learning needs due to the unpredictability of interdependencies created by the evolution of subsystems at uneven rates, which is again a typical challenge faced by technologically-complex NPD (Clark 1985; Brusoni et al., 2001) .
Involving suppliers in this interdependent and uncertain design work can be expected to raise significant problems of coordination. For example, although every supplier will have its own area of responsibility, when design changes are needed by one supplier there will be significant implications for many other suppliers (Sabbagh, 1995; Baba and Nobeoka, 1998; Adler et al., 1999) . These design contingencies are difficult to predict, understand, or articulate at the time of contract signing and so create difficulties of ex-ante cost and technical specification and therefore also create difficulties in ex-post coordination (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Williamson 1999) .
The existing literature advises two related responses to such supplier-coordination challenges. The first is to clearly distinguish between different kinds of suppliers, and the other is to form close and stable relations with certain suppliers. The first response categorizes suppliers in terms of their product-design skill level (Liker et al., 1996) , ranging from Tier 1 (capable of executing on the complete design, development, manufacture, integration, and support of a large, complex subsystem) through Tier 2 (who subcontract, typically with a Tier 1 supplier, for portions of the design and manufacture work on the subsystem that the Tier 1 is supplying) to Tiers 3 and 4 (a Tier 3 might assemble a few parts provided by one or more Tier 4 suppliers).
The second, complementary, response argues that trusting and stable relations can be focused on the relatively few Tier 1 suppliers (with other tiers managed at arm's length or by the Tier 1s themselves). This allows the firm and the Tier 1s to build superior information about each other and to develop such behavioral-control mechanisms as rules and routines, high trust, and a network macroculture, all of which reduce opportunism and enhance coordination (Dyer 1996; Jones et al., 1997; Uzzi, 1997; Gulati 2001) . Thus, difficulties in ex-ante cost and technical specification creating difficulties in ex-post coordination vanish. And continuous improvement in joint products and processes can be expected from the deployment in these stable relationships of concurrent engineering and such complementary mechanisms as benchmarking and "root cause" error detection (Helper et al., 2000) . In short, the existing literature implies that co-design relations must be of an homogenous and continuously improving form, that is, pursued with one kind of supplier (Tier 1), in one kind of governance mode (stable and trusting relationships), and deploying well-specified mechanisms for iterative co-design.
But there are problems with this view. First, the emphasis on trust and relationship stability prioritizes a single governance mode for co-design. But firms may typically rely on a mix of governance modes (Perrow, 1972) . More precisely, contracts, relational norms, and hierarchy might be better understood and deployed as complements rather than substitutes, especially in situations with complex and uncertain information-processing demands such as would characterize co-design. Poppo and Zenger (2002) is one of the few studies that directly examines the relation between governance modes by testing the proposition that contract and trust are not governance substitutes (a relation must be governed by one of the other) but complements (a relation can be better governed if both modes are employed). They find that managers tend to employ greater levels of relational norms as their contracts become increasingly customized and to employ greater contractual complexity as they develop greater levels of relational governance. They find that formal, customized contracts coupled with high levels of trust actually generate improvements in the performance of complex exchanges: the fact of the contract can, for example, support trusting behavior by making clear the terms of performance and non-performance. This prompts the question, what are the process implications for co-design when managing for high levels of complexity and uncertainty in information exchange?
Second, the research emphasis on trust and relationship stability relies on communication frequency (made possible by stability and small numbers) as a proxy for coordination (Terwiesch et al., 2002) and implies that through frequent contact trust and relational stability are just a matter of time. But this depreciates the social basis to cognition, and in particular the probability of important barriers to inter-firm collaboration due to the deep-rooted interpretive dynamics of selective perception and social categorization. That is, by virtue of individuals' sustained exposure to the goals, traditions, values, and schemas of a distinct demographic category such as a department or an organization, individuals selectively perceive problems and how to solve them. Organizations and the departments within them will differ systematically in the problems they identify as important or in how to address the same problem, and these organizational and departmental "thought worlds" are internally coherent and selfperpetuating (Douglas 1987; Miller 1990; Dougherty 1992) . Though this selective perception can form the basis for deep knowledge about some aspect of a problem, it makes collaboration difficult precisely because perceptions are directed in certain ways to the exclusion of alternatives-ways that individuals may not be fully conscious of. Individuals' perceptions are further structured by means of abstract social categories internalized as aspects of their self-concepts. This social categorization forms the basis for social comparisons and individual and group behavior as individuals knowingly act on the basis of perceived differences across categories (Tajfel, 1978) . This too can impede collaboration as information or behaviors are discounted or inflated depending on their association with particular social categories, for example, "supplier" or "lead-firm" behaviors. These problems prompt the question, what are the process implications for co-design of managing for diversity in information exchange?
In challenging existing thinking about co-design relations, I am speculating that the characteristics of information are inherent sources of instability, diversity, and tension in co-design relations. Testing this speculation requires direct and detailed study of co-design processes. This is such a study.
Setting and method
This study draws on data collected through continual access to the first two phases of a co-design project for a new commercial jet aircraft composed of a lead firm, AeroCo, and close to 20 supplier organizations.
1 The project was AeroCo's fifth co-design project. Due to AeroCo's desire to avoid dependence on a given supplier and also to exploit new suppliers' willingness to share in its success (the perception of various AeroCo and supplier informants was that new suppliers typically underestimated the costs of co-design with AeroCo), only five of the suppliers had prior experience of two or more AeroCo projects while six had no prior relationship at all with AeroCo. AeroCo determined the basic product concept and devised an initial definition of the aircraft through a benchmarking comparison of existing AeroCo and competing product designs. This design was decomposed into large subsystems (electrical, engine, avionics, etc.) for each of which a supplier was selected by AeroCo. Phases 1 and 2 comprised the major period of iterated co-design with suppliers (through which the provisional specification was significantly improved upon and fully articulated). The many design choices made in these two phases were informally estimated by AeroCo to determine 80% of production costs.
AeroCo has progressively withdrawn from design at the subsystem level. The suppliers, on the other hand, have been progressively upgrading to Tier 1 level. With this approach, AeroCo does not retain large in-house design staffs duplicating those of suppliers but looks to suppliers for solutions to design problems, not just hardware. Thus, each supplier was contracted to design and manufacture a distinct subsystem and was responsible for designing and/or procuring all subsystem components, specifying the subsystem interfaces, testing the subsystem separately, manufacturing the subsystem, and being fully involved in evaluating subsystem performance during integrated product testing. Only the airframe and engine were entirely new designs, with other subsystems being evolutions or adaptations of existing designs.
Subsystem design work by suppliers began upon the arrival of their design representatives on-site at AeroCo (Phase 1; project managers for each subsystem were also co-located at least part-time, and many more supplier personnel worked on the project off-site). During this first phase, suppliers worked on the conceptual definition of each 1 Details of the product or its subsystems and the names and precise number of participants have been disguised or omitted to assure anonymity. of their subsystems. Half-way through the phase, project leadership was transferred from AeroCo advance engineering to AeroCo project engineering.
Supplier selection was initially by invitation, and it was not until the end of Phase 1 that AeroCo and the suppliers had detailed negotiations on price. At this point, a few suppliers were de-selected due to an inability to agree on commercial terms (and were ultimately replaced by competitors). Shortly afterward, the project was formally launched. Formally, AeroCo management review and approval for launch constituted a distinct phase; in practice, it was seen as the terminal step in Phase 1, which is how I treat it here.
Phase 2 focused on interface definition across subsystems. Interferences between subsystems (such as parts of different subsystems occupying the same coordinates in space or competing demands for power consumption) are typically the major cause of interface problems in complex-product design (Sabbagh 1995; Adler et al., 1999) and are evidence of poor information exchange. A great deal of the design work was completed by the end of this phase (a particular objective was the "freezing" of these interfaces), and most supplier design personnel returned to their home bases. Typically, suppliers were not compensated for design changes made up to the end of Phase 2; the reverse was true after Phase 2.
Phase 3 was the period of detail design for each subsystem, that is, the definition by each supplier of production drawings. Like the earlier phases, this culminated in a complete design review (spread over several weeks at the AeroCo facility), after which these detailed drawings were frozen and formally released to each supplier's manufacturing unit. This release initiated the "final assembly phase" (Phase 4) in which suppliers began to ship finished subsystems to the AeroCo assembly facility, after which integrated product testing occurred (Phase 5; each supplier's on-site manpower presence increased again for this phase) at the AeroCo testing facility. In Phase 6-delivery into service-the interior and the exterior finishing according to customer orders was completed by AeroCo, the aircraft entered into service, and the project was formally completed.
In total, the six project phases lasted about three-and-a-half years; my data collection covered a period of about 15 months, of which three were immediately prior to Phase 1 and the remaining twelve spanned Phases 1 and 2. I conducted 78 semi-structured interviews (29 with supplier representatives), attended over 160 meetings, and reviewed a considerable quantity of technical and administrative documentation. The Appendix discusses the data in more detail.
My first task of analysis was to reduce these data to a briefer, more manageable form. I made a detailed literal abstract of each interview transcript. These abstract, 35-40% as long as the originals, included broad headings to summarize every topic discussed so I could easily see what material each interview covered. Following Strauss and Corbin (1990) , I then developed a scheme of codes to tag themes and statements of interest in the margins of the condensed transcripts. To develop an empirically grounded set of insights, I iterated between developing hunches, comparing these to fresh data, and then using this comparison to help decide whether to retain, revise, or discard emerging inferences. While most of this analysis was completed after data collection had ceased, periodic analysis throughout the data-collection period had helped sharpen questions, focus interviews and observations, and ground evolving theory.
From very early on in my research, it was clear that coordination mechanisms typical to co-design were extensively employed in the project, including cross-functional teaming, benchmarking, and joint design. But as my data accumulated, it became equally clear that the climate of relations was much different to what these rather neutral terms, and the literature, suggested. The work environment was of high pressure and often tense; relations with AeroCo were unstable and diverse: some suppliers were replaced at the end of Phase 1, some had never worked with AeroCo before, and there was no guarantee of any future work. Were these kinds of relations idiosyncratic or even pathological? Or were they more or less typical of co-design and merely unstudied? In probing the data to try to address these questions, distinct processes of coordination emerged as crucial data categories. Dimensionalizing these processes allowed me to identify how each process contributed distinctively to co-design and also how the processes differed systematically. Searching for systematic causes of clearly apparent coordination problems focused my attention on evidence of interactive effects between these processes and led me to conclude that these interactive effects made diversity, instability, and tension inherent to the co-design effort.
Results
In the first subsection of my results, I identify three coordination processes and demonstrate how these differed systematically. All three were continuously occurring throughout Phases 1 and 2. In the second subsection, I elaborate on this operationalization of coordination by explaining how the different coordination processes related to each other.
Coordination processes
The framework for co-design coordination summarized in Table 1 details three kinds of coordination processes derived from the data: hierarchical-dyadic, hierarchicalmultilateral, and lateral-dyadic.
Within each process, AeroCo and the suppliers each played different roles, in terms of who originated, disseminated, and assimilated the information exchanged. Suppliers and AeroCo variously played one or more or none of the roles of information origination, dissemination, and assimilation. The processes also differed with respect to the content of information exchanged, which was either technical or administrative and either formalized or not. Each coordination process also operationalized a distinctive perspective on the co-design task ("logic for information exchange"), namely, coordinating on the basis of administrative objectives ("consistency"), Table 1 A typology of coordination processes for co-design a Informal-administrative information exchange-for example, suppliers giving each other "tips" on how to meet administrative objectives-also occurred but seemed to be much less significant in my data. The terms for each of these logics were inspired by Porter (1996) . coordinating on the basis of product functionality objectives ("optimization"), and coordinating on the basis of suppliers' mutual objectives ("local complementarity"). Finally, the processes differed in terms of the coordination need each addressed, which implies that overall project performance depended on the use of all three processes.
Hierarchical-dyadic

Hierarchical-dyadic coordination
AeroCo/supplier roles. I call this process hierarchical, because it denotes coordination based on AeroCo's originating and disseminating project-planning requirements. These defined the administrative processes and cost objectives to which suppliers had to conform, and AeroCo monitored work based on these and intervened accordingly. I also call this process dyadic, because suppliers separately assimilated these requirements through interaction with AeroCo.
Content of information typically exchanged.
AeroCo sought to anticipate coordination problems through the means of detailed contracts and comprehensive developmentprocess standardization. This was an administrative system that broke down the work on every subsystem by phase and specified what the work in each phase was meant to produce in terms of common categories of formalized documents (or "phase deliverables"). The development process took the form of episodes of advance specification of design outputs for each phase, iteration around the development work in that phase, closing out the work of that phase through "exit reviews," and revising advance specifications for subsequent phases. This was a highly articulated application of the well-established "waterfall" approach for resolving design uncertainty over a sequence of stages (and reminiscent of the "spiral model" described by Boehm, 2000) . However, not only was the development process a series of (six) implementation phases with iterative relationships between successive phases but the many subsystem teams were also working in parallel and interdependently.
The following two quotes indicate the origination/dissemination and assimilation roles, respectively, of AeroCo and the suppliers with respect to project-planning requirements, the highly formalized nature of these, and that this definition of roles and content was crucial to coordinating the co-design effort. The two quotes demonstrate the belief-the process logic-that a flow of well-understood administrative deliverables is a good index for the design work being on track to meet project objectives. They also demonstrate the effort of adaptation (by suppliers) and monitoring (by AeroCo) that this belief required. Logic of consistency. Conceiving co-design in terms of shared cost parameters and of a shared flow of highly specified documentation. The technological complexity of the product meant that the many decisions and activities for each of the many subsystems were beyond the grasp of any single individual or even team, with the obvious danger that these could undermine or contradict each other. Determining the basic product concept and devising an initial definition of the aircraft in themselves could give only limited guidance to suppliers due to the high levels of interactivity and equifinality in how subsystems might be designed to meet product objectives. By requiring each team to import a standardized administrative basis-a low-cost orientation, common formats, methodologies, and schedulesfor its work, AeroCo sought to standardize how it interacted with the supplier teams and the flow of design information between it and each team. AeroCo sought to influence what and when information was exchanged, and how suppliers' used and reacted to information. This coordination process provided a basis for convergent expectations about the emerging design, because it facilitated comprehending and verifying the status of each team's design work and reduced the range of uncertainty that any given subsystem posed to the project.
Thus, this process coordinated the co-design effort by linking subsystem development to project planning. Respectively, critical and preliminary design reviews; these occurred in Phases 3 and 2, respectively.
3
The data presented are typically composite quotes. These denote a quote constructed from the words of more than one individual. Only complete thoughts are combined, with eclipses indicating a change of voice.
Hierarchical-multilateral coordination
AeroCo/supplier roles. I call this process hierarchical, because it denotes coordination based on AeroCo's originating the suppliers' subsystem-design problems by articulating product-performance parameters that the subsystems had to address-for example, the weight and the overall profile of the aircraft, the level of the floor, and how the wing would be attached. These "set the tone" (in the words of one supplier) for the design specifications of each of the many subsystems, with the satisfaction of each parameter emerging from the interactive design of several distinct subsystems. I also call this process multilateral, because coordination was based on simultaneous, network-like information exchange between the many suppliers-but this information exchange was directed and mediated by AeroCo. "Referee," "pilot," and "arbitrator" were terms used by AeroCo and supplier personnel to denote AeroCo's mixedly directive and mediating role.
AeroCo acted as a kind of clearing house for designing with respect to these parameters: suppliers assimilated the subsystem-design problems set by AeroCo and, subsequently, submitted to AeroCo their preliminary solutions to them (though each supplier will typically have interacted with one or more other suppliers regarding these first: see the following coordination process, "lateral-dyadic"). Upon approval by AeroCo, these initial design solutions were then disseminated as authoritative solutions to other suppliers, who would each design to them-and thereby "assimilate" them-as part of their ongoing work in originating design solutions in terms of each of their own subsystems. Alternatively, the AeroCo approval process could initiate the modification of design solutions, particularly with respect to interface issues, wherein AeroCo would actively arbitrate trade-offs between subsystems in terms of their impact on the performance of a given subsystem and of the product as a whole. The emphasis in this process was not whether, say, a deliverable was on time or in a particular format (the "consistency" logic), but whether it was substantively right.
As already noted, design work was reviewed in periodic phase reviews. But it was also reviewed and disseminated more or less continually through the role of "integrator." That is, each supplier's team was typically assigned one AeroCo engineering employee full-time who was the focal point for all of a subsystem team's concerns. This was a review and liaison role, with limited formal authority. The integrator had the specific responsibility of facilitating design compatibility between the particular subsystem and all other interfacing subsystems by constantly interrogating how the subsystem design was evolving, bearing in mind overall aircraft performance needs. The integrator liaised with other suppliers and AeroCo functions to manage the flow of information into and out of the subsystem team.
Content of information typically exchanged.
Technical information was exchanged in a formalized way in this process. The process coordinated the content of design decisions by requiring each team to iteratively export and import well-structured design information into and from the design network, such that the product design was progressively stabilized.
Thus, every supplier continually submitted its evolving design work into a digital model of the aircraft (based on off-the-shelf third-party software), and a key coordination task of each integrator was managing this flow of technical information through an "action items" database. This database centralized all actions suppliers and AeroCo raised for each other-which they could only do via a (standardized) coordination memo. Weekly meetings between an integrator and his subsystem team and biweekly reviews of all subsystems formalized the continual roll up of design decisions across all subsystems.
The following two quotes indicate the origination/dissemination roles of AeroCo and assimilation/origination roles of suppliers. That is, AeroCo originated productlevel parameters-such as "speed"-and disseminated suppliers' iterative solutions to these; suppliers assimilated the product level parameters, originated subsystem solutions with respect to these, and iteratively revised these proposed subsystem design solutions according to feedback resulting from the AeroCo dissemination processsuch as the implications for speed due to subsystem drag. The formalized technical nature of the information exchanged under this process is indicated by the several references to a hierarchy of technical problems and the corresponding hierarchy of roles between AeroCo and the suppliers, and the identification of a well-defined process for co-designing a hierarchy of solutions to these problems.
[AeroCo] provided basic designs, range, airspeed, wingspan, general geometry . . . [AeroCo's] Logic of optimizing. Conceiving co-design in terms of shared technical objectives.
The two quotes above demonstrate the belief-the process logic-that a robustly functioning product results from the technical finessing of all subsystems through the continuous pooling and querying of information on terms determined and actively managed by AeroCo. For example, this logic presumes that, left to himself, a supplier will likely design in terms either of isolated subsystem performance or of interactions with another specific subsystem (such as "the least amount of back pressure to the engine") rather than product performance (back pressure is a criterion that ignores drag, which must be optimized across many different subsystems).
Overcoming problems in simultaneously coordinating design work across multiple interacting subsystems in order to best meet product-functionality objectives required a coordination process that continually multi-varied the evolution of subsystem designs with respect to particular aspects of product functionality. Looked at as an isolated subsystem, no subsystem design was especially daunting, but looked at as part of a closely configured product system, every subsystem design was. The problem was one of the subsystem interdependencies that were known in a general sense but that were unknown for this aircraft: because each subsystem contributed to more than one functionality and because any type of aircraft is a unique mix of product functionalities, subsystem interactions had to be optimized in novel ways even for those subsystems the parts of which were entirely off the shelf. Resolving these interactive knowns and unknowns required organizing mediated, adaptive, and iterative intensive information exchange across subsystem teams for design integration. I call this the logic of optimization.
Thus, this process coordinated the co-design effort by linking subsystem development to achieving minimum-defined product functionalities.
Lateral-dyadic coordination
AeroCo/supplier roles. I call this process lateral, because it did not really involve AeroCo, just the subsystem experts-the suppliers-and I call it dyadic, because it operationalized inter-supplier coordination through pair-wise, interface-by-interface interactions. These interactions occurred through suppliers' informal to and fro between themselves on an as-needed basis. Suppliers would switch between the roles of origination and assimilation throughout this informal process.
Content of information typically exchanged.
The previous two kinds of coordination processes actuated the exchange of well-structured administrative and technical information. This third process further coordinated the content of design decisions through the exchange of much more preliminary design information. Design issues were often hard to articulate, and there were benefits to learning quickly together rather than trying to design on the basis of a detailed but quickly obsolete definition of the future product. Informal cross-team interactions had the potential to increase the probability of early mutual agreement between suppliers on interdependencies at a time when each subsystem team was less invested in a particular definition of its design relative to in later phases.
The following two quotes demonstrate the significance of the iterative and reciprocal origination and assimilation of preliminary and unformalized technical information by supplier pairs.
We wrote a memo to explain the electrical system -what power was available, in what flight profile, in what emergency conditions -5-6 pages, and saying we wanted to know only the location [of where the electrical subsystem would connect with the subsystem in question]. We got a lot of information and a lot of it was totally wrong: [we realized that] it's easy to understand electrical things but hard to know how the [electrical subsystem] will actually function in the systems in the aircraft. We had to go to each supplier and explain . . . For explaining, a memo is too hermetic. You need to have the guys in front of you asking "What happens if . . . ?"
[Supplier] "It's a matter of compromising -you don't say 'You must pass [aspect of subsystem] here and nowhere else'-we must explain because of this and this. But we also give [interfacing supplier] some limits so that they can place it another way. We learn more from other suppliers than from AeroCo [gives technical example] . . . It's all give and take, working through problems.
[Supplier composite]
Logic of locally complementing. Conceiving co-design in terms of subsystem pairs.
The first quote above indicates coordination by the electrical subsystem team on a pair-by-pair basis with other subsystem teams, and one interdependency at a time rather than the global "upwards to or downwards from" the product level of the other two coordination processes. The complexity of the design problem, and the asymmetrical nature of subsystem expertise, meant that no supplier or AeroCo could determine interfaces in isolation. The quotes together demonstrate the belief-the process logic-that suppliers had to have the freedom to work out interfaces between themselves. As interdependency issues emerged, it was often difficult to say which portion of the design work belonged to which of any two interfacing subsystems. Suppliers could bump this up to AeroCo to arbitrate or try to work things out locally. The second quote above emphasizes the latter, through a continual process of "give and take" between suppliers: this made for a less conflict-ridden information-exchange process and speedier resolution of interface issues. I call this the logic of locally complementing.
Thus, this process coordinated for co-design by linking intra-subsystem development to the definition of technically adequate interfaces for a given subsystem pair. Note that pair-wise interface definitions might theoretically accumulate to sufficiently address product functionality objectives (i.e., optimize). However, for a complex technology, there is a significant probability that pair-wise interface definitions could be technically correct but nonetheless inappropriate for a product given the functionality objectives for the product: this inappropriateness would be remedied by the optimizing logic of the hierarchical-multilateral process.
Persistent coordination problems in the project
In general, AeroCo has enjoyed good commercial success with its jet aircraft. Publicly, AeroCo senior management viewed performance for this project as "very successful." The aircraft met or exceeded all major project goals, such as range, price (a small percentage below what was anticipated when adjusted for inflation), cabin size, and orders for the product. However, while the time between project launch and first delivery significantly improved upon earlier projects, time-to-market estimated from the beginning of Phase 1 was actually several months longer than anticipated. Engineering change orders (i.e., design changes after Phase 2) were also significantly higher than anticipated and, ultimately, resulted in some margin compression for AeroCo.
The latter performance data suggest that there were probably unresolved or poorly resolved problems of coordination in the upstream phases that are the focus of this study. And, sure enough, persistent problems of coordination are much in evidence in my data. Some of these were remediable problems of refinement (e.g., forms were occasionally ambiguous and confusing, so it took some effort to figure out just what was being asked for). But what seemed especially significant problems were those I attribute to interactions across the coordination processes themselves.
Reflection on what the previous subsection had to say about the three coordination processes should suggest the synergistic potential of interactions between them. For example, lateral-dyadic coordination could lead to early mutual specification of interface specifications, which can, in turn, make hierarchical-multilateral coordination occur more smoothly as suppliers will already have gone some way to optimizing across their subsystems.
While I will expand upon these positive, or synergistic, interactions between the different coordination processes, I wish to concentrate on negative, or subtractive, interactions. I justify this emphasis not just because these negative interactions seem salient in my data but also because they seem rather to be due to tendencies inherent in each of the processes. This implies that the interactions pose much more of a challenge than a problem of coordination refinement. Focusing on these negative interactions would, therefore, seem to offer especially significant insights into how co-designing actually operates and how to manage it better.
Negative inter-process interactions occurred along each of the dimensions identified in Table 1 . For example, a strong emphasis on suppliers' assimilating administrative information (hierarchical-dyadic process) discouraged pro-active origination by suppliers as part of the hierarchical-multilateral and lateral-dyadic processes. The result was displacement of the substance of a design decision by the objective of consistently meeting project planning objectives: that is, a deliverable that is in the right format and on time but substantively shallow (maximizing on administrative information and requirements are a weak or harmful input into optimizing and preempt locally complementing). Table 2 summarizes these inter-process interactions. I inferred negative interactions to be fundamentally due to deep-rooted interpretive differences prompted by each coordination logic. Each logic elicits selective behaviors (or roles) and filters (and therefore exchanges) information selectively. More precisely, the negative interactions are identified as rooted in a tendency of each process toward its own illogical extreme: each process over-selects (or tries to) for its hallmark roles and information content. Finally, the interaction of any two logics needs to be treated as asymmetrical: for example, undermining of the optimizing logic (hierarchical-multilateral process) by the consistency logic (hierarchical-dyadic process) has different effects than if the consistency logic is being undermined by the optimizing logic (Table 2) . I now present in turn on each illogical tendency and its associated interactive effects.
The problem with consistency
The logic of consistency (hierarchical-dyadic process) has an illogical tendency to means-end inversion, that is, administrative parameters become an end in themselves, rigidly applied and not to be "messed up" by those applying them.
AeroCo Procurement and AeroCo Project Planning and Control (PP&C) exerted very strong influences on what was meant by consistency. It was PP&C that broke the time to market down by phases, specified and disseminated the flow of formalized deliverables, and "owned the schedule." In Phase 1, there were two workshops with the integrators on defining deliverables across all subsequent phases, two more workshops with a group that included a representative from most AeroCo functions, and some limited subsequent harmonization with each supplier. PP&C then policed and occasionally revised the flow and format of deliverables.
In the contract negotiations with suppliers (which occurred over several weeks after the end of Phase 1) subsystems were bargained for part by part in an effort to consistently drive down cost. AeroCo engineering advised on the technical capacity of a given supplier, but procurement retained sole knowledge of the costs agreed with Illogical extreme of disaggregation driven by supplier co-identification each supplier and essentially awarded the contract. Suppliers were contractually forbidden to share cost information with their integrators as procurement feared that engineering's knowledge of this information could prove "leaky," prompting invidious comparisons among the suppliers, or even somehow reaching a competitor. However, integrators felt that their own ignorance of costs and supplier margins made decision-making more complicated (e.g., they might be urging some design recommendation on a supplier not realizing the potential cost to the supplier). Procurement's key decision criterion was cost; PP&C's was the right format at the right time. Both targeted administrative certainty (what work was to be done, by when, and at what price) as a fundamental basis for co-design relations and together constituted a powerful frame of reference for the suppliers. Co-design behavior was targeted by PP&C and procurement to adapt to this dual department-based interpretive schema of consistency in the belief that doing so would assure a consistently low technical risk and low cost approach to achieving project objectives.
We keep relentless pressure on [our suppliers]. For example, on Tuesday [supplier] had 6 different individuals come and ask the same question on the schedule. The electrical schematics are the big crisis right now. They're doing okay but they missed a couple by a week and [AeroCo PP&C] is down on them like a ton of bricks . . . Companies hide things, there's an environment of people delivering just to make dates . . . There is a definite level of competitiveness between suppliers and no-one wants to be the tail-end Charlie [AeroCo/supplier composite]
Everything is squeezed so tight that no-one can just pick it up if something falls through the cracks. . . . Weight, electrical consumption -[AeroCo] will have problems optimizing . . . Maximizing off-the-shelf is always your first stab . . . Take the installation of a pipe in the wing -we had a design recommendation that seemed cheap but one part wasn't standard and of course we didn't want to do it but neither did the [wing supplier] . . . As soon as you reach the spec weight, people have no desire to go further. It will only cost us -not a lot, but . . .
[Supplier composite]
These quotes demonstrate the adaptation of behavior to what the frame of reference is understood to be, and decision "rightness" viewed in terms of a consistent form of deliverable received at a consistent time for each subsystem and that reflects design choices that keep consistent downward pressure on cost. The first quote demonstrates schedule-driven deviousness and competitiveness, and work interruption due to maximizing on the search for a particular form of deliverable (electrical schematics) by a particular time. The second quote demonstrates suppliers' resistance to optimizing due to AeroCo's maximizing on the search for low-cost subsystem design choices creating winners and losers in every design evolution and change.
The consistency frame of reference prompted a caution with respect to exchanging information (which might form the basis for unfavorably interrogating a design)-"hiding things"-and a rigidity of subsystem-design specification when confronted with indications of a need to adapt (locally or optimally). It reduced the search space for the technically best decisions, whether in terms of aircraft performance parameters such as weight (undermining optimizing) or the interfaces between two subsystems such as the mating of two parts (undermining locally complementing).
Thus can the logic of consistency interact subtractively with the logics of locally complementing and optimality.
The problem with optimizing
The logic of optimizing (hierarchical-multilateral process) has an illogical tendency to decision-making sclerosis, that is, the flow of decisions is retarded by ever-refining product performance.
With acceptance of the imperative to optimize came an appreciation of the ambiguity inherent in this complex product-design problem and fear of the technical consequences of making the wrong decision. These are fundamentally engineering criteria for problem-search and decision-making and target the resolution of technical uncertainty as a fundamental basis for co-design relations. Given the preponderance of engineers among the supplier representatives and AeroCo personnel with whom they interacted, this was potentially a powerful frame of reference: "we're all engineers" was affirmed in a number of AeroCo and supplier interviews as providing a fundamental basis for problem resolution. But because optimizing was decomposed across independent organizations, the scope for divergent interpretations of any given problem and its solution was widened, and the probability of any given proposed solution being challenged was increased. This divergence was compounded by the probability of technically equifinal solutions to a given problem, with differences across possible solutions driven by different design philosophies across suppliers.
Optimization also ultimately depended on AeroCo's decision processes, because AeroCo was the final authority for design decisions. Given that suppliers were, relative to AeroCo, increasingly the experts on their respective subsystems, AeroCo's ability to make technical decisions that were for the best of the aircraft was open to question. But so also was AeroCo's willingness to do so, in the hope that suppliers would pick up the slack, because the scope of suppliers' responsibilities was open to an extensive interpretation. All of these factors tended to retard the pace of decision-making.
I worked for some time in the computer industry before coming to [AeroCo] . It takes maybe a year to be useful there, but here maybe 5 years: you need to know a lot about the product but the product is so complex and so many things can go wrong and have such serious consequences . . . We ask for more [information] than we need because the product is complex . . . It could be us and [interfacing subsystem supplier] pointing out an interference but [AeroCo's] mentality is "wait and maybe somebody will pick it up". But it just festers. It becomes stressful -it gets lost in their system . . . Sometimes, you'll just shift your dirty laundry to the other guy.
[ These quotes demonstrate how a broadening of search space-"asking for more and more information," "over-designing," "pursuing a design issue no matter what that takes"-is fundamental to optimizing. However, the time and resources that this searching required caused information demands to propagate throughout the design work, overloading the decision system through generating too much information to review and retain or causing information to become hard to find and late and undermining the consistent advance on project objectives.
Alternatively, the need to optimize made more uncertain whether a locally complementary solution would be appropriate and be accepted. This fear of error demotivated suppliers' joint search for such solutions and retarded the flow of information between them. Suppliers were tempted to bump the interface issue up to AeroCo to resolve or tried to take advantage of one another by "shifting the dirty laundry" of interface resolution from one to the other.
Thus can the logic of optimizing interact subtractively with the logics of consistency and locally complementing.
The problem with locally complementing
The logic of locally complementing (lateral-dyadic process) has an illogical tendency to disaggregation, that is, interface decisions that are isolated from other decisions.
The lateral-dyadic process denotes a form of subsidiarity: encouraging coordination decisions to be handled at the lowest effective level in the design hierarchy. But for suppliers to be able to work out interdependencies between themselves, it was not enough that they be technically expert in their respective subsystems-they also needed to trust each other. Trust was necessary, because suppliers had to share intimate technical detail about their subsystems in order to customize the interactions between the subsystems. Trust was also necessary, because the definition of the interdependency emerged through an iterative process of give and take. Every supplier had to believe that it was giving in a context of good faith on the part of the other supplier and that this would be reciprocated. Given that suppliers were co-located for less than a year (the duration of Phases 1 and 2), and in many cases for even less than this (due to unevenness in the timing of supplier selection), and that most had no prior personal knowledge of each other, interpersonal trust was surprisingly strong. That this was so seemed in no small part due to the logic of locally complementing encouraging suppliers to see their interests as more congruent with each other than with AeroCo: "we the suppliers versus AeroCo the common enemy."
We have a lot of interaction with [other supplier] -we have a good working relationship maybe because [they] find an ally against the enemy -[AeroCo]! We'll defend [interfacing suppliers] if [AeroCo] is asking too much of them. We're happy to give something so that when we're stuck they'll give something back. They know what we are doing and that we take account of their problems. . . . I like the freedom to orient the design of equipment -it's a good way to optimize our system but not the aircraft [laughs] . . . Who's more interested in the aircraft being a 100% success? Don't get me wrong, but do two suppliers working together do what's best for the aircraft? [Supplier composite] This quote demonstrates suppliers' co-identification as a countervailing response to AeroCo's perceived power. This social identification between suppliers tended to undermine consistency when suppliers together pushed back on excessive timing, format, or cost demands made by AeroCo. Such resistance made decision outputs unavailable as an input to other decisions, delays propagated, and the consistent advance on project objectives was undermined.
When locally complementing ended in satisficing it also undermined optimization. That is, suppliers together might settle on an interface specification that was just good enough to handle a given interdependency between their subsystems and present this to AeroCo. Hiding risks or limitations in this manner, especially as these cumulate, only postponed optimization and compounded its difficulty by delaying it.
Thus can the logic of locally complementing interact subtractively with the logics of consistency and optimizing.
Discussion
To judge by the results of this study, co-design with suppliers requires several distinct coordination processes, each of which is necessary but insufficient for managing the attendant complex, uncertain, and diverse information-exchange demands. Limitations are inherent in each process, and how these limitations are managed determine whether the processes relate synergistically or subtractively to each other, to the respective benefit or detriment of the co-design effort. These results go beyond identifying whether coordination with suppliers occurred, or which specific coordination mechanisms were used (Liker et al., 1996; Takeishi 2001) to identify how coordination of co-design was actually operationalized. The study further shows instability and tensions to be systematically generated by the necessary diversity of coordination processes. Tense and unstable supplier relations are not news but are typically identified with suppliers' having a minimal role in product design (Helper, 1991) . That codesign relations might typically be tense, unstable, and diverse is news, at least judged in terms of the existing literature.
Note that my interpretation of (in)stability and diversity in supplier relations extends how these terms are used in the literature. Sticking with the same suppliers is too easily treated in the existing literature as a proxy for the presence or inevitable emergence of stable collaboration (Helper et al., 2000) . The instability that I identify does not denote just that AeroCo switched suppliers across projects but also that within a given relation there was considerable flux in who did what when and that agreement about this was fragile.
Nor does diversity in supplier relations just denote distinctions between Tiers 1, 2, and so on, of suppliers of the same firm, but rather diversity within the co-design relation itself, that is, the Tier 1 relation. Thus, in the pursuit of one kind of sourcing strategy-co-design-there was significant diversity at AeroCo: some of the relations were apparently stable (some suppliers had worked repeatedly with AeroCo)-but this cannot be said of relations in the aggregate; some relations were characterized by very little conflict for at least some of the time-but in the aggregate, there was much conflict; and getting the job done in the aggregate drew on quite different modes of coordination. Even repeat suppliers had relations with the lead firm that varied throughout the project because of the varying modes of coordination employed and interactions between these. And of course suppliers also had relations with each other ("lateral dyadic" coordination process), a topic hardly ever addressed in the existing literature. Indeed, the diversity of coordination processes indicates a complicated mix of contractual, hierarchical, and trust-based relating as inherent to co-design. This diversity was systematically produced, as were instability and tension in the relations.
Department-based ways of seeing uncertainty and deciding what to do about it seem to have provided the cognitive bases for the illogical tendencies of both the consistency logic and the optimizing logic. That is, the specialties of project planning and of procurement viewed project uncertainty as best managed through attention to such administrative parameters as cost, schedule, and formats, and tended to pursue codesign according to these parameters-the consistency logic. On the other hand, the specialty of engineering (and including both AeroCo and supplier personnel) viewed project uncertainty as best managed through attention to technical parameters-the optimizing logic. Finally, social categorization seems significant to the logic of locally complementing: that is, suppliers viewed project uncertainty as managed through the identification of shared interests in opposition to AeroCo.
The extent to which a given coordination process's illogical tendency is actually pursued also depended on the distribution of power: unchecked by a countervailing authority, one department-or organization-based way of seeing or one conspiracy of interests will come to dominate others. The tendency toward means-end inversion is the illogical tendency that seems most pronounced in my data. This I attribute to power imbalances, between PP&C/procurement and AeroCo engineering, on the one hand, and AeroCo and the suppliers, on the other.
Interpretive dynamics due to selective perception, social categorization, and power imbalances are not unique to co-design, being well-established phenomena in research on the social basis to cognition (Lukes 1974; Tajfel 1978; Douglas 1987) . Nonetheless, their significance to co-design relations between a firm and its suppliers has been overlooked. They significantly limit the possibilities for homogenous, stable, and harmonious relations and mean that difficulties in co-design relations cannot be easily attributed to random or idiosyncratic dysfunctions in the firm or suppliers (Herrigel 2004; Whitford and Zeitlin 2004) . Nor does it seem reasonable to suggest that unstable and tense relations are pathological when such a pathology can only be defined relative to what seems like a greatly overstated norm of stable and harmonious relations.
Implications for theory and practice
The study is limited by its exploratory, single-case nature, and the inattention to other possibly significant factors, such as product-concept effectiveness, the involvement of senior management, the composition of the various teams, and the skill of those involved. Any of these could generate important difficulties for the coordination of co-design that could not be directly attributed to the nature or interactions of coordination processes. Nevertheless, the distinctions drawn between the processes of coordination identified by the study seem significant in explaining the coordination challenges posed by co-design.
The study suggests two important implications for the study and implementation of co-design. The first is the need for organizations and researchers to learn about the diversity of co-design coordination processes and the inherent tensions between these processes. The co-design process was decomposed across different processes of coordination and demanded careful attention to how the roles for, and content of, information exchange varied under each process. This required ongoing technological and administrative learning by both the suppliers and the lead firm. Suppliers and lead firms both need to learn how to manage this learning.
The second implication builds on the first: the coordination processes need to be consciously implemented as a coherent system. Co-design depends on this much more than on the use of particular mechanisms or best practices or tools. The three processes identified in this study will not be simply additive in their effects on coordination. Managing the interactions between the three processes requires ensuring that the processes are understood as equally meaningful, and properly motivating suppliers.
Making coordination processes equally meaningful. The extent to which a given coordination process dominates in co-design heavily depends on dynamics internal to the lead firm. A lead firm's internal departments have inherently more stable relations with each other than the firm does with its suppliers. This relative stability makes internal understanding of how to coordinate for co-design a significant basis for how suppliers understand co-design. Positive feedback loops that push a logic toward its extreme probably have the best chance of being attenuated when no single logic is allowed to dominate decision-making internal to the lead firm. For example, social identification among suppliers could be a source of resistance to the logic of consistency, causing project management to push even harder to implement this logic, which generates yet more resistance. If one coordination process is viewed as more meaningful internally than another, this will manifest itself in suppliers' attending to information exchange according to that process in ways that undermine the other processes and identified in this article. Because there is some identification between coordination processes and particular functional orientations (i.e., the hierarchical-dyadic was strongly oriented to PP&C and procurement objectives; hierarchical-multilateral was strongly oriented to engineering objectives), this makes inter-functional collaboration in the lead firm important in a way that has been little commented upon: improving the quality of internal coordination will improve the quality of external coordination. Thus, improved internal collaboration-a more balanced distribution of power-would avoid over-reliance on a particular coordination process and likely be important in specifically targeting synergistic relations between the coordination processes.
Supplier motivation. The previous implication addressed interactions between internal and external relations. The external relations can also be acted on more directly by motivating suppliers to make the right choices on a continual basis. Identification with the project provides an important reference point for supplier personnel on how to interpret a design issue: to categorize it as threat or opportunity, assess its importance, whether and how to act on it, and what constitutes a legitimate solution. Joint decision-making with AeroCo will be important to building such identification as it is a key means for suppliers to safeguard their investments in the project ex-post the contract. While stability of network membership might facilitate joint decisionmaking, it is not clear that such stability would be sufficient or even necessary. The objective is not social integration but motivating the suppliers by influencing the terms of their decision-making. This could take the form, for example, of pricing design changes in an internal market, whereby suppliers could partly meet design objectives by trading improvements on some design parameter (such as weight reductions) with each other. In this way, cost-based calculations that generate such subtractive interactions as satisficing or a narrowing of search space-the "stopping at the mark" that was indicated in the results section-can be attenuated.
Future research
Research is necessary to clarify and test these findings and their implications. While the study clearly supports the inference that overall coordination quality is not merely additive of distinctive coordination processes, relations between these processes are treated as synergistic or subtractive in a pair-wise fashion. This fails to clarify the precise nature of the relations. This is partly a measurement problem: I have not identified any means of robustly measuring the quality of coordination under each process nor of the effect of their interactions. But it is also partly a conceptual problem, as one could speculate that whether relations between the coordination processes are synergistic or subtractive depends on implementation thresholds that each coordination logic must reach (lower threshold) and a threshold beyond which each should not go (upper threshold). Before and after these thresholds, interactions are probably subtractive and within the thresholds synergistic, respectively.
I have also paid little attention to differences in coordination and learning needs between different suppliers. Differences in coordination needs might be due to the relative novelty and complexity of a subsystem or to a supplier's relational history with AeroCo. However, the processes identified here do provide a basis for evaluating these differences. For example, suppliers who have previously worked with the lead firm should have absorbed much of the procedural knowledge that informs hierarchical-dyadic coordination and should need to manage and be managed less intensively with respect to this. Thus, future research could specify the factors that influence where a given subsystem team should focus its learning investments for a project.
Further research could also examine how coordination processes differ or are alike for the downstream tasks of assembling and testing the product. This would help connect the study more closely to existing research, which emphasizes information exchange between upstream and downstream activities rather than within the upstream activity itself (Adler et al., 1999; Clark and Fujimoto 1991) .
In conclusion, this study should contribute to improving co-design for complex development projects. The identification of distinctive processes of coordination and how these relate to each other captures significant technical and social aspects of codesign in a coherent framework. The study shows that interpretive dynamics are important to co-design and that these can be studied systematically. Continued research into how development-process design influences product design should enhance our understanding of complex NPD.
In order to better access issues later in the development process and to sharpen my research questions, I also attended seven change-management meetings for the immediately preceding project in the weeks before and after integrated testing for that product began (i.e., Phase 5) and interviewed six AeroCo personnel working on that project. In addition, supplier and AeroCo personnel with experience of more than one project provided retrospective data on later-phase development issues. These data are accounted for in the figures given above.
